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Abstract
The complexity of liquidity risk in nature makes its precise definition a 
very cumbersome task. Though, it is the lifeblood of any organization it 
has not been given attention until recent. The given attention by the 
stakeholders does not commensurate with its importance. Indeed, the 
survival of a banking institution as well as the success of the whole 
financial system depends on availability of liquidity and ability to 
understand the rudiment of its risk for proper mitigation. This paper makes 
a bold attempt to shed more light on important issues related to liquidity 
risk and also examines some of its important features. 
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1.0 Introduction 
Risk, an exposure to a chance of loss is naturally inherent in every sphere of life, be it social 
or economic, individual or corporation. Banking institutions are no exceptions (Greuning & 
Bratanovic, 2003). In the financial institutions’ parlance, risk is a common phenomenon. It is 
inherently present in all the financial transactions, particularly banking activities. Although, 
banks, in their banking operations are exposed to many risks, unlike in the recent past, the 
attentions of the banks’ management, policy makers and the regulators are currently focused 
on liquidity risk
Giving liquidity risk a specific definition is a herculean task due to the fact that it is a 
complex subject. Quite a number of studies agreed that it is easier to identify symptoms and 
2the causes of liquidity risk than defining it. To enhance the knowledge of the subject matter 
there is need to examine some related issues and relevant features. 
The fundamental maturities transformation function of banking institutions involves 
obtaining funding from short-term deposits to finance loans at a relatively long-term. This 
and other operations of banking institutions are indeed very risky. As the financial 
intermediation function exposes banks to the risk of the demand for repayments by depositors 
usually beyond the financial institution’s capacity to transform assets into cash (Miguel et al., 
2006). However, banks are expected to have ability to assess maturity profiles of their assets 
and liabilities together with the associated returns and risks (ECB, 2002). This is believed 
will afford them the opportunity to determine the type and amount of liquid assets they can 
hold to meet the desired and required threshold for maturity mismatch.  
There are six sections in this paper with section one introducing the subject matter of the 
paper. Section two examines the nature and characteristics of liquidity risk, section three 
discusses assets and liabilities as the cause of mismatch with respect to the resultant liquidity 
risk. Section four examines the relationship among investment, liquidity risk and banking 
crisis. Section five looks into the regulation and supervision of bank liquidity while the last 
section six concludes the paper. 
2 Nature and Characteristics of Liquidity Risk
The common understanding of banking in the literature is the capacity of the bank to meet its 
cash obligations when they fall due (Valla et al., 2006). But anything on the contrary induces 
liquidity risk. To fully comprehend the concept of liquidity risk in the banking system, it is 
noteworthy understanding the essence of liquidity to the banks. As explained by Durmus 
(2011), there are two main objectives of bank’s liquidity: First, to ensure that banks can 
conveniently meet their expected and unexpected cash obligations at all times. Second, 
3contribute to the profitability of the banks. The funding sources usually employed by banks to 
meet these objectives, significantly depends on their business mix, balance-sheet structure, 
and the cash flow profiles (Greuning & Bratanovic, 2003). Banks in the course of managing 
their cash-flows usually encounter various situations such as funding mismatches, market 
constraints on their ability to convert assets into cash or increasing sources of funding and 
contingent liquidity events (Nikolaou, 2009). 
Bank’s inability to effectively and efficiently manage the maturity mismatch of its assets and 
liabilities, the unplanned changes in the funding sources or address changes in the market 
conditions is capable of giving rise to liquidity risk (Durmus, 2011).  Liquidity risk is defined 
by the Office of Thrift Supervision in its 2010 examination handbook as the risk to a 
saving/credit institution’s earning and capital that arises from its inability to meet its due 
obligations in a timely manner, without incurring unacceptable loss. Liquidity risk is 
classified by Joint Forum of Basel Committee on Banking Supervision into market liquidity 
risk and funding liquidity risk
2.1 Market Liquidity Risk
As discussed earlier, liquidity is a concept that describes the capacity of a financial institution 
to fund increase in assets, meet cash and other obligations without incurring unacceptable 
losses (Prassana, 2010 and Anjum, 2012). Based on the nature of banking business, banks 
usually invest in loans (assets) with longer maturity more than banks’ borrowing (liabilities) 
which exposes banks to the risk that funding liquidity may dry-up ( Lee, 2010). Often 
referred to as roll over risk, potential shortages of funding liquidity may result due to roll 
over of its short-term borrowing, increased demands for funds by borrowers and sudden 
drastic reduction in deposits (Greuning & Bratanovic, 2003 and Lee, 2010).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
Therefore, Durmus (2011) argued that liquidity is a vital organ of market dynamism and its 
4inefficiency is always the root course of market stress. Parassana (2010) noted that liquidity 
shortage constrains a financial institution’s ability to quickly liquidate assets in the market 
with minimal loss in value.
However, banks’ usual attempt to withhold liquid assets for the purpose of covering 
unexpected mismatches between cash inflow and outflow links the liquidity of individual 
institution to the market liquidity (Acharya et al, 2009a).  Market liquidity is described by 
Bervas (2008) as a fundamental and integral part of financial system due to its importance as 
a precondition for market efficiency and its sudden absence in the market may degenerate to 
a systemic crisis. Level and vibrancy of market liquidity depends on the availability of 
adequate number of counterparties in the market and their readiness to trade (Johnson, 2007). 
Hence, in his view a market is said to be liquid if it is easy to trade, in the sense that buyers 
and sellers are readily available and at similar prices to accommodate the transaction demand. 
A market adjudged perfect liquid “would therefore, guarantee a single ‘bid-ask’  price at all 
times and irrespective of the quantities being traded (Bervas, 2008). 
However, ‘illiquidity’ of the market arises when asset positions ceased to be normally traded 
with little bid-ask spread , but rather at a substantial discount   Prassana (2010) confirmed the 
changing nature of the financial assets’ liquidity which can be distributed to the common 
component in the liquidity across assets. They argued that market liquidity is a function of 
market depth and its continuity which are greatly influenced by two important factors 
namely; trading strategies and the chosen hedging methods. Furthermore, they claimed that 
market liquidity risk has a close relationship with the transaction size, product type, current 
market sentiment and the trading position. Therefore, it is logical to say that liquidity 
shortage condition indicate a relatively small number and size of day-to-day transactions 
which represents the size of portfolio trading positions that the market can absorb at a given 
level. Arguably, limited absorption capacity of the market leads to inability to quickly sell 
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trading portfolios. This could happen when a crisis ridden market where only very few people 
show interest in buying more securities (Al-Janabi, 2009). He therefore suggested that 
financial institutions should give due recognition to the asset liquidity risk and its relationship 
with the market risk for trading positions because it is capable of increasing the loss to the 
overall market risk exposure. 
This shows that there is a kind of interrelationship between market and liquidity risk and can 
have simultaneous impact on each other (Al-janabi, 2009). Sharing similar view with Al-
janabi, Kolja (2006) emphasized that liquidity risk is inherent in every market and it 
manifests itself in every transactions involving assets/portfolios trading. He pointed out that 
from the bank’s perspective, this could occur in three situations, viz;
1. Normal daily business activities
2. Investments, and
3. Fire-sales during times of shortage of funds.
Therefore, he suggested that every bank should have in place funding liquidity 
mitigation strategies, laying out precise action plan on how additional funding is to be 
acquired in order to prevent insolvency.
2.2 Funding Liquidity Risk
A vast number of studies hold it that though banks are structurally illiquid due to the nature 
of their business, but liquidity shortage is a financial element that always manifests during 
major financial crisis. In the general sense, financial crisis refers to a period of huge 
depreciation in market prices and scarcity of liquidity in the financial markets (Lee, 2010). 
Also, whenever, there is financial crisis, market experiences massive capital outflows which 
if no more or at least equal inflows, depletes the available liquidity and it may be a more 
6difficult task for banks to raise funds in the interbank market (FSC, 2010 and Lee, 2010). The 
general consensus of literature on banking system and financial stability is that interbank 
lending market is a crucial factor for banks experiencing funding constraints in their liquidity 
requirements. Lee (2010) believe that the ability of a bank to borrow either in interbank 
market or elsewhere can be reduced by funding constraints which if persists may lead to 
decline in stock prices and eventually a financial crisis. Therefore, banks as providers of 
liquidity in the economy have to properly and efficiently manage their cash outflows (assets) 
and cash inflows (liabilities) in order to ensure availability of sufficient liquidity at all times.  
In a nutshell, funding constraints plays a crucial role in the genesis and spread of financial 
crisis (Durmus, 2011). 
The core business of banking institutions has always been and still remains liquidity 
production (Negret, 2009). That is the traditional financial intermediation of banking system 
through mobilization of short-term deposit to fund long-term loans involves production of 
funding liquidity. For instance, a depositor’s cash withdrawal or a firm’s borrowing through a 
credit line from a bank; the issuing bank has by the way provided funding liquidity for the 
customers. In that sense, negative impact of financial intermediation is as a result of funding 
liquidity constraints (Johnson, 2007). Funding liquidity risk therefore, relates to the inability 
of a financial intermediary to service its financial obligations when they fall due at a 
reasonable cost (Praet & Herzberg, 2008). It is intrinsically relevant, particularly to the 
commercial banks whose major business is funding illiquid loans through liquid deposits 
(Lee, 2010). 
Negret (2009) viewed funding liquidity risk as an ubiquitous risk of the financial system. By 
the nature of its business, a bank is subject to liquidity risk as it assumes the possibility of 
funding liquidity risk as a result of maturity mismatches of its assets and liability (Brehmann 
& Nilolaou, 2009). A bank’s funding liquidity problems, if not immediately addressed can 
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prices in order to raise cash, thereby, reducing its capital (Negret, 2009). Lee (2010) argued 
that funding liquidity risk is systemic in nature because of balance sheet interconnections 
among banks. For instance, a liquidity stricken bank which tries to raise loans from other 
banks in the interbank money market tends to spread its liquidity problems throughout the 
financial system. 
Generally, the degree of funding liquidity risk is influenced by the availability of the four 
major liquidity sources (Nikolaou, 2009). These sources are as follows;
1. Short-term (liquid) deposit: Banks gets funding liquidity through money entrusted 
to them by depositors which is considered in literature as the most stable source 
of funding liquidity.
2. The market: Banks can always sell their assets in the market to generate liquidity 
and can as well generate it through securitization, loan syndication and loans 
from secondary markets 
3. Interbank market: A bank can source for liquidity from the interbank money 
market which is believed to be an important source of liquidity.
4. The Central Bank: A bank can directly source for liquidity from the Central bank, 
making use of Central Bank’s facilities of Lender of Last Resort.
In addition, the ability of a bank to satisfy the budget constraints over the respective time 
horizon also have great influence on the level of funding liquidity risk (Nikolaou, 2009).
Nevertheless, traditionally, banks’ primary sources of funding has always been short-term, 
stable and low cost demand, saving and time deposits. In contrast, these are used to generate 
rather, illiquid loans which expose banks to fundamental risk. Notwithstanding, Negret 
(2009) argued that banks in normal circumstance could be liquid as long as long as liquid 
asset are more or at least equal to more volatile liquid liabilities. However, the trend in 
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markets source of funding and a reduction in liquid asset ratios (Lee, 2010). In other words, 
instead of banks sourcing for liquidity through retail deposit, they tend to increasingly rely on 
the interbank borrowing, short and long term debts (i.e. securitized or collateralized funding), 
or sales of marketable securities (Negret, 2009). This, he believes has the tendency of raising 
funding liquidity risk especially when banks’ wholesale funding is keenly concentrated at 
shorter maturities which requires regular financing. However, the general assumption of 
numerous studies is that issuance of long-term notes, asset-backed securities (ABS) or 
covered bonds to match the associated assets maturity could be a way of reducing banks’ 
liquidity susceptibilities/ exposures.
This is a clear indication that there is a linkage between market liquidity risk and funding 
liquidity risk. It is an attestation in support of the studies by Brunnemeir and Pederson (2007) 
and Drehamann and Nikolaou (2008) which respectively rationalized and validated linkage 
between market liquidity and funding liquidity risk.
No doubt, liquidity concept is very critical to the banking operations whether when the 
economy is booming and liquidity risk is low (normal periods) or under stress when the 
liquidity risk is very high (turbulent periods). Liquidity is believed to have two major 
components, viz; source of funds and application of funds (ORACLE, 2009). In other words 
liquidity is made up of market liquidity and funding liquidity. Negret (2009) demonstrate a 
clear and strong linkages and dynamic dependencies between market and funding liquidity.  





9Figure 1: The relationship between funding liquidity and market liquidity
Source: Negret (2009)
With illustration shown in the diagram above, he illustrated how endeavor to sell significant 
amount of assets that are less liquid may trigger market illiquidity (indicated by arrow 1), 
thereby incapacitating the financial institution from raising the originally planned amount. 
Also, he shows how funding needs can arise from illiquidity of the market (this is illustrated 
by channel 2), most especially when it is impracticable for an institution to securitize or 
syndicate loans. This idea is overwhelmingly supported by Caruana and Kodres (2008) with 
the argument that the recent global crisis clearly indicated that market illiquidity can quickly 
turn into funding illiquidity. They argued that the use of alternative assumptions about the 
liquidity of particular assets can have significant implication for bank’s funding plan. 
Furthermore, general market liquidity risk can be reduced by the attempt of the institution to 
sell assets, an action which is contagious and capable of subjecting other institution to 
liquidity pressure (Negret, 2009). He argued that other institutions can be exposed to earnings 
and capital pressures by ‘fire sales’ induced fall in market prices. This is illustrated by 
channel 3  whereby these other institutions are in need of their own liquidity and effort to 
meet their funding needs their asset sales creates a potential feedback loop to market 
illiquidity (as shown by channel 4). The channel 5 shows that the action of these institutions 
that suffer large liquidity shortfalls and seek to close out their lending positions, particularly 
in the interbank money market create direct funding liquidity needs for other market 
participants (Negret, 2009). Therefore, it can be inferred that market liquidity risk and 
funding liquidity risk are interrelated and can simultaneously have impact on each other (Al-
Janabi, 2009)
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3. Asset and Liability Mismatch (liquidity gap) and Liquidity Risk
Bank’s efficiency and performance strictly depends on the banks’ ability to balance its quest 
for profit maximization and ensuring its liquidity with the minimum risk. Successful 
performance of a bank is to some extent determined by its prudently selected asset and 
liability management strategy, especially paying special attention to the loan portfolio 
(Bervas, 2008). As a profit oriented firm, bank in order to ensure maximized profit, must 
maximize the volume of long-term loans and at the same time maintains the required 
liquidity.  This requires a proper asset and liability maturity management which plays a 
critical role in planning and merging different business lines in a financial institution. In fact, 
mismatch of assets and liabilities across various business lines can be used in identifying 
potential liquidity risks and analyzing the impact of maturity transformation on the financial 
institution’s liquidity (Katalysys, 2011)
Maturity mismatches of assets and liabilities (liquidity gap)  often result in liquidity risk of 
any financial institution and such liquidity shortages make banks to be susceptible to market 
liquidity risk (FIGB, 2007and Bessis, 2002). Bessis (2002) explained that when liabilities 
exceed assets, it shows that there are excess funds available to the banks and such excesses, 
due to the uncertainty in the revenues from the investments of these excess assets, generate 
interest rate risk. The higher the maturity of the loan or deposit, the higher will be the offered 
interest rate (FIGB, 2007). On the other way round, whenever banks’ assets are greater than 
liabilities, liquidity deficit always manifests and invariably induces deficit in market liquidity. 
That is the banks available resources are not sufficient to fund the banks’ long-term 
commitments. This demands immediate funding from the market. 
He explained further, that this situation/scenario exposes the banks to two risks; the risk of 
not being able to raise the required liquid on the market, and the risk of paying higher costs in 
order to meet the liquidity requirement. Burucs (2008) agreed that liquidity risk in a financial 
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institution can arise from many sources, but maintained that asset or liability related liquidity 
risk can emanate from the following sources listed in the table below.
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Table 1: Asset and Liability Sources of Liquidity Risk
                             Asset-related                           Liability-related
1. Insufficient availability of 
collateral
2. Disruption in payment settlement 
system
3. Increased collateral requirements 
due to markets risk losses, ratings 
triggers or asymmetric 
documentation
4. Inadequacy of a firm’s 
infrastructure to conduct 
securitization transaction
5. Reduced liquidity of outright 
market for securities
6. Too large a trading position 
relative to market volume, open 
interest, and number of market 
makers
7. Failure of specialist liquidity 
providers in niche security 
markets
8. Unwillingness of counterparties 
to the settlement risk on collateral 
transfer across time zones
9. Spurious diversification, while 
portfolios might be diversified 
strategies may be correlated 
across counterparties
10. Lack of demonstrable liquidity 
due to bespoke nature of 
transaction 
1. Accelerated withdrawal of 
relationship- based and 
transactional deposit from banks 
and dealers
2. Lack of competitive deposit 
strategy and products
3. More rapid loan than deposit
4. Loss of access to unsecured 
wholesale funding or extreme 
increase in cost
5. Materials dependence on 
wholesale short-and long-term 
unsecured funding, including 
from higher-rated counterparties
6. Failure of providers of 
unsecured funds
7. Concentration of wholesale 
funding sources
8. Reduction in the availability of 
money market lines available to 
the bank
9. Reduced ability to raise term 
money
10. Reliance on credit dependent 
sources of secured funding, 
correspondingly, availability of 
committed irrevocable secured 
funding lines
11. Restricted access to secured 
funding markets
12. Reliance on synthetic funding 
from better-rated counterparties




The issue of liquidity gap is viewed in an alternative way by Rose and Hudgins (2002). They 
looked at it from the point of differences in the average maturity dates of the assets and 
liabilities. They argued that matching maturities of all assets and liabilities indicates zero 
difference in their maturity dates, but the average maturity dates will differ if there is a time 
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mismatch. Bessis (2002) claimed that “the average maturity date calculation weighs the 
maturity with the book values of outstanding balances of assets and liabilities.” Inability of 
bank to service its liabilities as a result of even slightest liquidity mismatch for at least a few 
hours can cause a run on the bank. The consequent liquidity risk may lead to the liquidation 
of even a solvent bank. Therefore, FIGB (2007) suggests banks’ liquidity risk management 
strategy that will aim at elimination of the risk and mitigate the liquidity mismatch (gap). 
However, based on the FIGB (2007) belief that liquidity gap cannot be completely eliminated 
in banking operation but can only be reduced, Rose and Hudguis (2010) in effort to mitigate 
the problem of maturity mismatching suggests the following steps that banks are expected to 
follow:
 Measure expected daily gross flows,
 Monitor intraday liquidity positions against expected activities,
 Acquire sufficient intraday funding,
 Mobilize the collateral as necessary,
 Manage the timing liquidity outflows, and
 Deal with unexpected disruption.
However, ORACLE (2011) argued that managing assets and liabilities as well as 
liquidity risk are very critical for the smooth operation and existence of a financial institution 
and sustenance of its operation. Hence, FIGB (2007) agreed that liquidity can be managed by 
adopting the following strategies:
 Holding liquid investments.
 Keeping open dependable lines of credit.
 Maintaining a presence in the interbank market by regular borrowing and lending.
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 Maintaining credibility and good reputation with depositors/lenders to ensure that 
matured liabilities are promptly renewed.
4. Investments, Banking Crisis and Liquidity Risk 
The recent studies’ discovery of lack of liquidity as the main killer of organizations and 
liquidity risk as the major business concern is giving business organization serious sleepless 
nights. Its importance is demonstrated by the regulators’ introduction of tighter regulations 
for liquidity management and investors’ closer scrutiny of the investment portfolios (Korea 
Institute of Finance, 2010). In fact, Johnson (2007) sees it as very important for the policy 
makers as well as investors to understand liquidity dynamics because it is of paramount 
importance and greater necessity for the implementation of a dynamic portfolio strategy. 
Lawrence (2006) observed that corporate investment decisions are affected by financial 
constraints especially when the institution faces either imperfect or incomplete financial 
markets whereby the cost of internal capital is far below the cost of external capital.
Pastor and Strambaugh (2003) agreed with the views of recent studies that liquidity plays a 
prominent role in the investment environment and macro economy and that 
fluctuation/volatility in various measures of liquidity are correlated across assets. Cash 
inflows volatility, a resultant effect of assets and liabilities mismatch can be used to identify 
liquidity risk and its impact on the investment levels and as well serve as a guide to set 
internal limits and assist in liquidity pricing (Kalalysys, 2011). Joao (2001) predicted that 
during a particular period, a firm’s cash flow volatility will be negatively associated with its 
average discretionary investment measured over the same period. In other words, the 
volatility portends the likelihood that the firm experiences cash flow shortfalls and ultimately 
forgoes investment opportunities. 
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However, Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) argued that it makes sense for investors to require 
higher expected returns on assets whose returns have higher sensitivities to aggregate 
liquidity. This is in line with finding of Lawrence (2006) that assets having higher sensitivity 
to innovations in aggregate liquidity have higher expected returns. 
Similarly, Acharya et al. (2009b) find that banking assets are highly sensitive to 
macroeconomic shocks. Banks, because they are limited liability entities have affinity for 
risky assets, regardless the fact that cash flows of risky assets are illiquid and their 
pledgeability is limited (Acharya, 2009b). He argued that banks are induced to hold liquid 
assets in their portfolio due to the risky assets ‘cash flows” limited pledgeability and the 
potential for future acquisitions at fire-sale price. However, it is further argued that in an 
adverse state of the markets, assets prices can plunge below their original value, thereby 
giving rise to fire-sale pricing. Meanwhile it is only the banks that are able to survive the 
adverse situation and possess enough liquidity that stand the chance of making windfall 
profits from purchasing assets at fire-sale prices. Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) suggest that if 
banks hold assets that have higher liquidity sensitivity it might lead to the likely occurrence 
of liquidation when the liquidity is low. Therefore, Acharya et al. (2009a) believed that the 
expected profit from risky assets when the economy is on the upswing are very high as well 
as their pledgeability. 
Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) found out that assets having more volatile liquidity attract 
lower expected returns which expose banks to liquidity problems and eventual failure. Banks’ 
choice of liquidity is usually affected by the intervention policies aimed at resolving bank 
failures (Acharya et al., 2009b). The three different policies considered by Acharya et al. 
(2009b) are as follows;
i. Liquidity support to failed banks. 
ii. Unconditional liquidity support to surviving banks.
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iii. Liquidity support to surviving banks conditional on the level of liquid assets in 
their portfolios.
They proved that the first policy tends to limit re-sale opportunities and the second one 
provides guarantee to the surviving banks’ desired liquidity for acquisition at re-sale prices. 
Both policies have tendency to discourage banks from holding liquidity. On the other hand, 
they confirmed that the third policy increases banks’ incentives to hold liquidity. Acharya et 
al. (2009a &2009b) agreed that liquid assets have lower returns than illiquid assets. They 
suggest that banks should solve a portfolio choice problem and maximize their profits 
through prudent consideration on how much to invest in risky assets and its timing. The 
Office of Thrift Supervision agreed that managing the timing and maturity of assets 
appropriately as well as prudent management of liability cash flows coupled with effective 
regulations can enhance liquidity and as well prevent bank failures.
5. Regulations and Supervision of Bank Liquidity
Considering the important role banks play in financial intermediation and the fact that 
liquidity is not only crucial to the viability of a banking organization, but to the whole 
financial system one will undoubtedly agree that regulation of the liquidity risk of a bank is 
necessary and cannot be compromised. Due to contagion effects, liquidity shortages of a 
financial institution can have systemic repercussions causing instability of the financial 
system (James et al., 2001). 
Effective regulations and supervision of financial institutions can help a lot to mitigate 
inherent financial risks in banking operations (Ewerhart & Valla, 2008). ECB (2002) stressed 
that regulation, in the form of regulatory liquidity ratios, deposit insurance scheme, tax and 
reinvestment rules, and minimum reserve requirements plays an important role in the 
liquidity features of a banking system. Supervision on the other hand can be in the form of 
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interbank peer/ official-monitoring strategies or centralized supervision. The importance of 
the role of regulation and supervision can be much felt most especially, in turbulent times 
when vicious circle is created between funding and market liquidity which has potentiality of 
leading to systemic failures within the financial system (Nikolaou, 2009). Efficient 
supervision involves development of liquidity policy/regime which may be based on a 
combination of system and control requirements and a quantitative regulatory framework 
(Joao, 2001). Joao explained that the system and control section stipulates the standard for the 
identification, measurement, monitoring and control of liquidity risk with specific aspects 
which inter alia include the responsibilities of a firm’s governing body and senior 
management, setting of limits and requirements (such as need for firms to perform stress 
scenario testing and putting in place sound contingency funding plan). While the purpose of 
the qualitative section is to design a single liquidity risk framework for financial institutions 
which will set out the quantity or extent of liquidity risk that an institution may incur (ECB, 
2002).  Furthermore, it explained that the designed framework is also meant to take account 
of firms’ different roles in the liquidity provision to the other part of the financial system.
However, Nikolaou noted that effective regulation is desirable because it will safeguard and 
support the implementation as well as fostering the effectiveness of supervision.  Miguel et 
al. (2006) recommended that efficient supervision has to do with evaluation of a bank’s 
strategies, policies, procedures and practices related to the management of liquidity. All these 
they suggested should be conducted independently. Nikolaou (2009) argued that a 
combination of effective regulation and efficient supervision is capable of enhancing new 
financial products’ development with intent to enlarge the pool of assets for various risk 
appetites and help to complete markets. In other words, they can directly mitigate the causes 
of the liquidity problem. To be able to achieve these feats, ECB (2002) suggests that banks’ 
supervisors should on continuous basis monitor the banks’ liquidity position both on an 
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individual and on group-wide basis and an appropriate limit for the liquidity target should be 
defined, putting the overall situation of the institution into consideration. If effective 
regulation and efficient supervision that can act against causes of liquidity problems could be 
achieved and guaranteed in banking institutions, definitely, the role of Central bank’s 
liquidity as a first buffer for problems caused by liquidity shortfalls would have its 
importance reduced, if not rendered redundant. In that sense, the relevance and efficiency of 
central bank liquidity will depend on quality of regulation and supervision in the financial 
system.
This view seems to corroborate the position of Goodfriend and King (1989) that peer- 
monitoring of institutions can unofficially impose market discipline in the system. They 
suggest that “deregulated markets can successfully discipline themselves through their 
financial instruments and practices in order to provide a well-functioning market. This view 
is also shared by Goodhart (2008) who favoured collateralized inter-bank lending and 
increased banks’ responsibility by transferring costs of failures to the originating banks. 
Nevertheless, Nikolaou (2009) argued that implementation of efficient supervision and 
effective regulation is very importance and cannot be trivialized.  Likewise, some other 
authors are in support of establishment of official regulation and supervision. Their argument 
is that centralizing regulation and supervision in the hand of central bank will enhance 
transparency and make it easier to differentiate between illiquid and insolvent institution, 
thereby reducing the costs of central bank’s intervention. The financial system would be 
insulated against early stage coordination failures and consequently, leads to elimination of 
systemic liquidity risk (Brehmann and Nikolaou, 2009).
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6. Conclusion
This paper establishes the fact that risk is inherent in the financial system as banks are 
subjected to a variety of risks, including liquidity risk while performing their functions as 
financial intermediaries. Liquidity problems been the bane of the recent global financial 
crunch, the general concept and definitions of liquidity and liquidity risks, their importance as 
well as consequences if left unmanaged are given due attention and thoroughly discussed. 
Two types of banks related liquidity (i.e. market liquidity and funding liquidity) and liquidity 
risks (market liquidity risk and funding liquidity risk) are also identified and discussed as 
well.
Probing into the banking risks led to the discussion on the sources of liquidity risk in the 
banking system as well as the nature and characteristics of liquidity risk. Also thrashed out 
are important issues such as the asset and liability mismatch (liquidity gap) and its 
relationship with liquidity risk with distinction made between asset related liquidity risk and 
liability related liquidity risk. The paper also deliberated on issues that involve relationship 
among banks’ investments, banking crisis and liquidity risk. Due to the havoc liquidity risk is 
capable of wrecking to the stability of the financial system, this paper believes the role of 
effective regulation and supervision in mitigating the liquidity risk cannot be 
overemphasized. 
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